Tuesday, June 30, 2009

Afghan President's Alliances With Warlords Raise Concerns

President Hamid Karzai has run the country since a UN-backed deal put him in charge in December 2001.

June 18, 2009

By Abubakar Siddique

It is a conspicuous show of power and wealth: Afghan strongmen roam the streets of Kabul in model sports utility vehicles surrounded by bands of armed bodyguards.

They want to be called "mujahedin" freedom fighters -- those who led the "holy war" against Soviet occupation in the 1980s and then fought the hard-line Taliban during the 1990s.

But many Afghans see them as rapacious warlords who led their country to the brink of disintegration, destroying Kabul and other major cities in an atrocious civil war during the 1990s.

They also are seen as thugs who may have killed, maimed, or terrorized more Afghans than the Soviet invaders.

Most of these strongmen now back incumbent President Hamid Karzai's reelection bid and eye Kabul's "Arg-e Shahi" presidential palace as a citadel of their power and influence.

Winning Friends

While opinion polls in Afghanistan suggest Karzai is well ahead of rival candidates in the upcoming presidential election, one of his key election maneuvers has been to build a formidable alliance of regional warlords.

The moves may help secure his reelection on August 20. But they are raising critical questions about governance, accountability, and the rule of law in Afghanistan.

In a move that has worried critics and rights activists, Karzai's office says General Abdul Rashid Dostum, a powerful ethnic Uzbek warlord from northern Afghanistan, can return to Afghanistan whenever he wishes.

Dostum reportedly is living in self-imposed exile in Turkey after he was charged with kidnapping and torturing a political rival last year. Dostum's militia fighters also stand accused of war crimes for allegedly suffocating hundreds of Taliban prisoners in shipping containers.

Dostum and another warlord, Mohammad Mohaqiq, have declared public support for Karzai's reelection bid. They did so after reportedly being promised control of several cabinet posts each in a future Karzai administration. That agreement is thought to be last in a series of deals between Karzai and Afghanistan's notorious factional militia commanders.

In A Bind

Another deal in early May led Karzai to choose the powerful ethnic-Tajik commander Mohammad Qasim Fahim Khan as his running mate. That deal has drawn criticism as a bad omen for democracy and human rights in Afghanistan.

Fahim has a reputation for brutality and serious human rights violations as a former guerrilla leader.

Spanish diplomat Francesc Vendrell, who spent nearly eight years in Afghanistan as a United Nations and European Union envoy, tells RFE/RL that Karzai's alliances with warlords are deplorable.

But he says Karzai has shown great political skills by building such a big coalition of support.

"Considering that, unfortunately, there are no political parties in Afghanistan -- and certainly no reformist political parties for which, I think, the West bears some responsibility -- I think he has been extremely skillful, from his viewpoint, in weaving a fabric of supporters who, whether they are warlords or not, [all support him]," Vendrell says.

But he "deplores" the choice of Fahim as a Karzai running mate because Vendrell and his colleagues engaged in painstaking diplomacy between 2002 and 2004 that eventually persuaded Karzai to drop Fahim from his ticket during the 2004 presidential election.

"Fahim had the makings of a national warlord, which is far more serious. And of course he was in a position of taking over from Karzai if something happened to him," Vendrell recalls. "Well now he has chosen him again. And I doubt that he will bring many votes, amongst the [ethnic] Tajiks. He may even take [away] some support from Pashtuns for Karzai. I really find it quite bizarre that he has chosen Fahim again."

Expensive Subcontractors

Karzai inherited the warlord problem eight years ago under the UN-sponsored Bonn agreement that made him the head of Afghanistan's first post-Taliban transitional administration. The Bonn Accords also awarded cabinet posts to anti-Taliban militia commanders whose fighters held de facto control over Kabul.

Ahmed Rashid, author of "Decent into Chaos," has chronicled how the U.S.-led coalition spent hundreds of millions of dollars to prop up those commanders. Rashid concludes that the policy reinvigorated Afghanistan's illegal drug industry and paved the way for the birth of a neo-Taliban insurgency by subcontracting security to the warlords.

Last month, Karzai acknowledged that the upcoming election will be "difficult and controversial." But he defended his alliances with strongmen like Fahim, saying that such deals are important steps for national reconciliation.

"We need a man upon whom we can rely in hard times -- for a president, that is extremely important, and Fahim Khan will deliver that," Karzai told participants at a Washington seminar in early May. "Fahim Khan has been one of those people who contributed immensely in the war against terrorism, shoulder-to-shoulder with U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan.

Karzai added that "for stability, for continuity, [and] for taking the country forward in difficult times, we have decided to have him. It is good for us. It is good for America."

But many Afghans see Karzai's warlord alliances as a dubious political tactic that ultimately will do more harm than good.

'Criminals At The Heart' Of Government

In Kabul, Afghan businessman Khan Jan Alekozai suggests that instead of being held accountable for past atrocities, warlords have exploited their political and military ties with the U.S.-led coalition -- continuing to engage in criminal enterprise with impunity.

"These people continued their old habits," Alekozai says to explain the popular perception of warlords. "Although they trimmed their beards and began wearing business suits, their mentality never changed. They continued with looting, plundering and deceit."

He suggests that the warlord power is growing with every day. "They now manipulate the government, aid projects, [major] business contracts and these strongmen virtually control Afghanistan wealth," Alekozai says. "They kidnap traders and investors as they patronize kidnapping rackets. [And] all this happens while foreign powers look on."

Alekozai says that the Afghans are grateful for the sacrifices in blood and treasure that the United States and its Western allies are making to bring stability back to their country.

"But the Afghans still have doubts about them because they relied on people here who had failed Afghans in the past because they raped people and had killed their children," he says.

Alekozai says Afghan hopes for transparent governance, respect for human rights, and the rule of law cannot be realized as long as warlords enjoy impunity.

Such views are echoed widely.

Brad Adams, the London-based Asia director for Human Rights Watch, tells RFE/RL that Karzai's alliance with the warlords is a disaster. "It is a disaster for Afghanistan. It puts criminals, including war criminals, at the very heart of a future Karzai administration," Adams says.

Adams suggests that the real challenge is the growing strength of the warlords. "They are growing in strength now, though; that's the problem," he says. "The more that they are brought into the heart of government, the more access to resources they have."

He cites access to "narco-dollars" from the drug trade and involvement in corrupt or otherwise illegal business, saying they amass huge wealth. "The wealthier they get...the more they can pay people to be their foot soldiers."

Adams suggests that warlords could eventually become a much bigger problem than the Taliban insurgency. "It goes counter to the whole idea of building up the state and a proper army and proper police force -- doing away with illegal armed groups, and it's going to cause long-term problems," he predicts. "Even if the Taliban movement fades or is defeated, then they are going to deal with this problem -- which is going to be very big."

Western diplomats and military leaders say the inclusion of warlords in government projects a negative public image. They cite examples of a few individuals who have grown from being militia commanders into their new roles as administrators and political leaders. Some point to historical parallels with France in the Middle Ages, when successive dynasties cut deals with regional strongmen and gradually brought them into the national mainstream.

But Afghans reject such parallels and point to the centralized progressive Afghan state that foreign-sponsored warlords have brought down through their infighting.

Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.

UN Chief, Japan Call for Pressure on North Korea

By VOA News
30 June 2009

Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso says the international community needs to put strong pressure on North Korea under a new United Nations sanctions regime.

The Japanese leader said it is necessary that North Korea understand that it will not benefit from what he called "further acts of provocation."

Mr. Aso spoke in Tokyo Tuesday, where his foreign minister met with U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon for talks on North Korea and other issues.

The Japanese prime minister is scheduled to meet with Mr. Ban on Wednesday.

The U.N. secretary-general called on U.N. member states to implement a new resolution that tightens sanctions against North Korea.

Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso,
in Tokyo


On Monday, Japanese police arrested three men for allegedly attempting to export a magnetic measuring device to Burma that could be used to develop missiles.

The company that was trying to export the device is based in China, but is believed to have links to North Korea's government.

The international community is stepping up efforts to monitor North Korea's trading practices and its proliferation of missile technology.

A U.S. Navy destroyer is tracking a North Korean vessel, the Kang Nam, which some South Korean media reports say is heading to Burma via Singapore.

The ship belongs to a fleet that U.S. officials say has been used in the past to transport weapons.

Also Monday, South Korea's defense minister, Lee Sang-hee, said North Korea appears to be pushing forward with a uranium enrichment program, which he said far easier to hide than the North's current plutonium-based program.

North Korea has ample supplies of natural uranium, and it could conduct an enrichment program in underground or undisclosed facilities, away from the view of U.S. spy satellites.

Earlier this month, after the United Nations placed more sanctions on North Korea for carrying out its second nuclear test in May, Pyongyang said it would start enriching uranium.

The U.S. State Department's new coordinator for North Korea sanctions, Philip Goldberg, is traveling to China on Tuesday on his first foreign trip in that role. Goldberg's mission is to persuade China, a North Korean ally and trading partner, to enforce the sanctions rigorously.

Some information for this report was provided by AFP, AP and Reuters.


Source: Voice of America

Russian Prosecutor Gets Nine Years For Bribery

June 30, 2009

Dmitry Dovgy in court in August 2008

MOSCOW (Reuters) -- A former Russian prosecutor who led a politically charged corruption investigation has been sentenced to nine years in prison for taking a bribe, a court official said.

Dmitry Dovgy had led the investigation of Sergei Storchak, deputy finance minister and Russia's foreign-debt negotiator who was arrested in November 2007 on embezzlement charges widely seen as an attack on liberal Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin.

Dovgy, top investigator of the Prosecutor-General's Investigative Committee, was arrested in August and charged with taking a 750,000-euro ($1.06 million) bribe in another case.

A jury last week found him guilty of accepting the bribe. On June 30 a Moscow City Court judge sentenced him to nine years in a high-security prison, court spokeswoman Anna Usachyova said.

Another former prosecutor, Andrei Sagura, who was charged with receiving the bribe on Dovgy's behalf, was sentenced to eight years in prison on June 29, Usachyova said.

Storchak, who denied the charges, was released in October after spending nearly a year in jail pending trial. He is still to face court over charges of trying to embezzle $43 million in a debt deal with Algeria.

Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.

World Bank: Internet, Mobile Phones Key to Growth

By VOA News
30 June 2009

A World Bank report said access to affordable high-speed Internet and mobile phone services are key to economic growth in developing countries.

The report released Tuesday found that for every 10 percent increase in high speed Internet connections, there is a 1.3 percent increase in economic growth.

The study said mobile phones are the single most powerful way to reach and deliver public and private services to people in remote and rural areas in developing countries.

It also said broadband Internet is the foundation for local information technology (IT) services. The World Bank said these services create youth employment, increase productivity and exports and promote social inclusion.

The report said evidence from Brazil, Ghana and India shows that governments using modern Internet technology can become more efficient, transparent and responsive.

Some information for this report was provided by AFP.

Source: Voice of America

Anti-Malaria Charity Pays for Nothing But Nets

By Meredith Hegg
Washington, D.C.
June 30, 2009

Despite the huge toll that malaria takes on the world, preventing the disease is relatively easy. Since most transmissions occur through mosquito bites in the middle of the night, widespread use of long-lasting, insecticide-treated bednets can reduce transmission by as much as 90 percent.

That's why the United Nations Foundation, a public charity created to support UN goals, has a campaign devoted entirely to raising money to purchase bed nets.

Creation of a unique partnership

The campaign is called Nothing But Nets. The name not only highlights the group's sole mission; it's also the way people describe a basketball shot that goes right through the hoop, touching nothing but the net.

Sports writer Rick Reilly visits a mother and child in Nigeria

The sports connection is no accident. The campaign was launched by American sports writer Rick Reilly. In 2006, Reilly wrote a column in Sports Illustrated asking readers to give money to the U.N. Foundation to buy bednets. More than 17-thousand people responded, sending in more than one million dollars.

Following the success of this initial drive, the U.N. Foundation, the National Basketball Association, the United Methodist Church and other groups partnered together to form Nothing But Nets.

Executive Director Elizabeth Gore says, "The Nothing But Nets campaign has been responsible, thus far, for raising 26 million dollars, which translates into 2.6 million nets, which is a big part of this. The U.N. System is now up to distributing almost 20 million nets a year."

Big problems caused by little mosquitoes

A child in Mali clutches a new bed net

Every bit of prevention is important, considering the devastating effects of malaria around the world. There are about 300 million infections and one million deaths from malaria each year. Malaria hits children the hardest, to the extent that an infected child dies approximately every 30 seconds.

The disease also has broader impacts.

"Malaria is also hurting all of our other efforts from getting kids to school to people that are on anti-retroviral drugs dying of malaria," Gore says. "It's a root cause of poverty."

Nets for refugees

More recently, Nothing But Nets has partnered with the U.N. High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) to distribute nets in refugee camps. Refugees and internally displaced peoples are among those most vulnerable to malaria.

According to Thomas Albrecht of UNHCR, "Refugee situations are often very complex, but here we can see that one can make a concrete difference without having to go into much analysis."

Success in tough times


Volunteers distribute nets in Chad

Perhaps because of this concreteness, enthusiasm for the Nothing But Nets campaign has remained strong, even in a troubled economy.

Gore explains, "Just in the last four months, this campaign's been doing better than ever, so even though we're in this economic downturn, we raised more money in December than we ever have in the campaign."

The grassroots organization of Nothing But Nets has also helped maintain its effectiveness. Consider 14-year-old Elisabeth Clymer. She first got involved with Nothing But Nets as part of a school project. She felt so strongly about it that she quickly got her church's youth group on board. Now her youth group organizes monthly collections at the church.


A mother in Cote d'Ivoire picks up a net


Clymer reports, "On World Malaria Day we… collected almost two thousand dollars just in spare change."

With an average donation of just 60 dollars, Nothing But Nets will need the help of hundreds of netraiser volunteers like Clymer in order to achieve their lofty goals.

"What we're trying to do is cover every sleeping space on the continent of Africa, which is around 300 million people or spaces, give or take," Gore says.

That may sound ambitious, but so is the United Nations' ultimate goal.As part of the Millennium Development Goals, the United Nations would like to eradicate malaria by 2015.

Source: Voice of America

U.S. Base in Honduras on Shut-down Following Uprising

By Jim Garamone
American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, June 30, 2009 – There are no current threats to U.S. servicemembers serving in Honduras following last week’s ouster of the Honduran president, U.S. Southern Command officials said today.

The 600 American soldiers, sailors and airmen based at Soto Cano Air Base are staying on the base and not conducting exercises with the Honduran military, said Robert Appin, deputy director for public information and outreach at Southern Command in Miami.

The Honduran military reportedly ousted President Manuel Zelaya on June 28. President Barack Obama has expressed concern over the development and said the Hondurans need to work the problem out.

The last off-base operation was June 26 when U.S. servicemembers concluded a medical readiness exercise, Appin said.

Army Col. Richard A. Juergens, commander of Soto Cano, ordered the air base closed following Zelaya’s ouster. “No one is allowed off base except for emergency situations,” Appin said. “All travel is restricted.”

U.S. forces have served in Honduras since the early 1980s. A mix of active and reserve component servicemembers work with local forces and local institutions. Servicemembers deploy for either six months or a year to Soto Cano, Appin said.

Source: American Forces Press Service

US Targets More Firms for North Korea Sanctions

By David Gollust
State Department
30 June 2009

The United States on Tuesday added two more companies to its lists of firms facing sanctions for allegedly aiding North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. The move cames as a senior U.S. envoy left Washington for Beijing on a mission aimed at getting China to help tighten the international financial squeeze on Pyongyang.

The Obama administration is imposing sanctions on two companies - one in North Korea and the other described as a North Korean front-company based in Iran - as it tries to persuade China and other Asian countries to do the same in order to curb Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs.

The State Department said North Korea's Namchongang Trading Corporation was being targeted with a U.S. asset freeze and other penalties because of its role in acquiring aluminum tubes and other hardware that can be used for a uranium enrichment program.

At the same time, the U.S. Treasury Department said it is targeting Hong Kong Electronics, based in Iran's Kish Island free trade zone in the Persian Gulf. The firm is suspected of providing support for North Korean companies designated for sanctions under a U.N. Security Council resolution.

Treasury Undersecretary Stuart Levey said North Korea uses front companies like Hong Kong Electronics to obscure illegitimate transactions.

The Treasury Department says Hong Kong Electronics facilitated the movement of funds from Iran to a North Korean bank that is the financial arm for KOMID - a company identified as North Korea's main exporter of ballistic missile technology and equipment.

The new sanctions, among other things, freeze any U.S. assets the two companies might have and bar them from engaging in any transactions with American firms and individuals. It is unclear what effect the action will have, but it underlines the U.S. commitment to tighten North Korea sanctions as a U.S. envoy travels to Asia on the issue.


State Deptartment Spokesman Ian Kelly (File)


State Department Spokesman Ian Kelly said newly-named envoy Philip Goldberg is on a trip to China and other Asian destinations to urge compliance with the U.N. Security Council sanctions resolution approved earlier this month after North Korea's May 25 nuclear test - its second since 2006.

"Ambassador Philip Goldberg, Coordinator for Implementation of U.N. Security Council resolution 1874, today leads an inter-agency delegation - including representatives of the National Security Council and the Departments of Treasury and Defense to Beijing," said Ian Kelly. "His delegation will have meetings July 2nd and 3rd in Beijing with representative of Foreign Affairs and other ministries involved in the implementation of resolution 1874."

Kelly said Goldberg, a former U.S. ambassador to Bolivia, would hold talks with other U.S. partners in the region, but that he had no details on the rest of Goldberg's itinerary.

Resolution 1874, which condemns the North Korean nuclear test, authorizes tightened sanctions aimed at cutting off funding for Pyongyang's nuclear, missile and proliferation activities.

On Monday, The New York Times reported that one of Goldberg's biggest challenges will be to persuade China - North Korea's biggest trading partner and aid provider - to be rigorous in enforcing the sanctions.

The newspaper said there was little evidence, based on trade figures, to suggest that China had gone forward with sanctions called for in the previous Security Council resolution.

Source:Voice of America

Bounty For Pakistani Taliban leader

June 28, 2009

Pakistan has offered a $615,000 reward for information leading to the capture of Baitullah Mehsud, the local Taliban leader who is currently in hiding in the tribal belt.

Two national Urdu-language newspapers and local papers in the northwestern city of Peshawar carried adverts on Sunday offering rewards for Mehsud, dead or alive, as also for 10 other senior members.

"The government has announced a cash reward for anybody providing authentic information leading to the capture of these (11), dead or alive," the advertisement, which listed the men's names and bounties, said.

"Innocent people are being killed because of the bloody activities of these so-called defenders of Islam."



Mehsud already has a $5m bounty on his head that was promised by the US state department [EPA]


Pakistani air force jets have been attacking Taliban hideouts for several weeks as the government prepares to launch a ground operation to root out Mehsud and his men.

Fayyaz Tooro, home secretary of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), said the reward announcements marked the first time the Pakistan government had put a price for Mehsud's capture.

"This list has been issued by the interior ministry and has been published for the first time in close co-operation with security agencies, which provided invaluable information to the government," Tooro said.

Hostile territory

Mehsud, who allegedly has ties to al-Qaeda, already has a $5m bounty on his head that was promised by the US state department, which considers him "a key al-Qaeda facilitator in the tribal areas of South Waziristan".

Pakistan blames Mehsud for a wave of deadly attacks that have killed hundreds of people in the past two years and has vowed to remove him from his fiefdom.

Pakistan's military is likely to try to stir up rivalries among the Taliban in order to gain allies before any operation into the hostile territory Afghanistan's border, analysts and security sources say.

But Qari Zainuddin, a rising tribal leader who defected from Mehsud's Taliban group, was assassinated recently in an attack claimed by Mehsud's tribe, dashing hopes of internal divisions.

Pakistan's northwestern region has become a stronghold for both al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters who fled Afghanistan following the US-led invasion that toppled the Taliban government in 2001.

Mehsud organised tribal fighters together and formed his Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan group in 2007.

Since then, he has extended his reach into North Waziristan and Bajaur among other federally administered tribal areas.

A $615,000 reward for Maulana Fazlullah, the Taliban chief of Swat valley in the NWFP, has already been offered by Pakistan.

Yousuf Raza Gilani, Pakistan's prime minister, said on Sunday that the military operation in Swat had been almost completed.

"The entire nation wants terrorism to be eliminated and law and order restored," he said.

"There is no room for any negotiations with the militants. This is the time for a decisive action against them."

Source: Al Jazeera

Bugs Found In Georgian Opposition Parties' Offices

June 30, 2009

Eavesdropping bugs have been discovered in the offices of three Georgian opposition parties - installed in electrical sockets.

The leader of the Way of Georgia party, ex-minister of foreign affairs Salome Zurabishvili, said that the devices were found on Monday where meetings take place among leaders of the party, which is demanding the resignation of current Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili.

“They were found by employees of the party in the electrical sockets of the room,” said Zurabishvili, who showed the devices to journalists.

“Eavesdropping on the party is one of the forms of repression in regards to the party.”

She added: “The authorities must uncover and punish those who installed these devices in the party office.”

Zurabishvili also said they had called the police, who, however, made no attempt to hurry to arrive at the office.

“We are sure that the bugs have been put there by the interior ministry. In any other democratic country there would have been a political scandal after that, but here, I bet the authorities will blame the opposition for putting bugs in its own office,” says one of the opposition leaders Levon Gachechiladze.

In the office of another opposition party, The Georgian Conservative Party, more listening devices were found on Tuesday.

As Georgian Conservative Party leader Zviad Dzidziguri says, since November 7 when the authorities dispersed a peaceful demonstration, around 30 such devices have been found in offices of various opposition parties.

"Not one criminal case has been opened into these matters, which indicates who is bugging the opposition," said Zviad Dzidziguri.

In a third party’s offices, those of The Alliance for Georgia, listening devices were also found on Tuesday.

The Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs announced on Tuesday that a case had been opened into the discovery of bugging devices in offices of opposition parties, but said that the devices were not particularly hard to get.

"To acquire devices like these a special license is not needed and any citizen can buy them abroad or in Georgia," read a distributed announcement.

"The above-mentioned circumstance complicates the investigation," said the Ministry.

Georgian ombudsman Sozar Subari said on Tuesday that the discovered bugs "point to the establishment of a repressive regime based on bugging opponents."

"Proving who installed the devices won't be difficult as the name of the seller and buyer have been encoded in them and an average citizen cannot simply buy them," said Subari.

Source: Russia Today

Gazprom Is Losing Europe


June 30,2009

MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti economic commentator Oleg Mityayev) - European gas consumers are frantically looking for an alternative to Russian natural gas. At the same time, Russian energy giant Gazprom is doing its best to control all gas supplies from the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Towards this end, Gazprom signed an agreement with Azerbaijan on June 29 to purchase all of its export gas in order to prevent the U.S. and Europe-advocated Nabucco project from succeeding.

The same day, Poland signed a contract on gas supplies with a rival of Gazprom, Qatargas.

Azerbaijani gas

During Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's blitz visit to Baku on June 29, Gazprom coordinated the acquisition of 500 million cubic meters of natural gas annually from the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (Socar) beginning on January 1, 2010.

Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller said it was a small amount, but "well begun is half done."

Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said his country would produce 27 billion cu m (bcm) of natural gas in 2009 and planned to increase production to 30 bcm next year. This means that Azerbaijan's deliveries to Russia will grow, too. At present, the country supplies the bulk of its natural gas to Turkey and Georgia.

Russia has rich hydrocarbon resources, and so it is more important to it that Gazprom has been added to the list of priority buyers of Azerbaijani gas from the second phase of the Shah Deniz deposit, which is expected to yield 16 bcm annually.

The second phase of the deposit will come on stream only in 2014, but the European Union considers it the main supplier of the Nabucco gas pipeline, which it plans to build across Turkey, bypassing Russia.

According to unofficial information, Russia is prepared to buy Azerbaijani gas at a record high price, $350 per 1,000 cu m. Therefore, other potential buyers of the Shah Deniz gas will have to offer a higher price to Socar to outbid Gazprom.

Until recently, Azerbaijan was the only post-Soviet country from which Russia did not buy natural gas.

On the other hand, the profitability of such contracts is questionable. According to Gazprom's management, Azerbaijani gas will be supplied to south Russian regions, so that comparable amounts of Russian gas could be redirected to Europe. But Russia is unlikely to increase its gas supplies to Europe soon because of plummeting demand. Therefore, the deal will have no commercial effect at best.

Early this year, Gazprom said it would buy Turkmen gas for $300 per 1,000 cu m, but then it stopped collecting it because of falling demand and prices in Europe, provoking an explosion at the Turkmen pipeline and a subsequent conflict between the two countries.

Azerbaijan, which doesn't like to keep all its eggs in one basket, also has a gas supply contract with Europe. However, the signing of an intergovernmental agreement on the Nabucco project has been postponed.

Poland makes a deal with Qatar

On the same day, June 29, Polish oil and gas monopoly PGNiG signed an agreement with Qatargas on the annual supply of 1 million metric tons of liquefied natural gas, LNG, which is equivalent to 1.5 bcm of natural gas, from 2014 to 2034. PGNiG is to build a regasification terminal in time for these deliveries.

At present, Poland consumes 13.7 billion cubic meters of gas annually, out of which 7 bcm is supplied by Gazprom, according to the International Energy Agency. Therefore, the deal with Qatar, which may reduce Russian gas supplies by 20%, is Poland's first step toward lowering its dependence on Russian gas.

However, Gazprom is itself to blame for the appearance of a rival company, Qatargas, in Europe. It was because of its efforts to maintain its monopoly position in the European market and to purchase all gas produced in the CIS that Europeans started searching for ways to diversify gas routes.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

Source: RIA Novosti

Over 20 Kilograms Of Heroin Seized On Dushanbe-Moscow Train



MOSCOW, June 29 (RIA Novosti) - Russian customs officers have seized more than 20 kilograms of heroin from conductors on a train from Tajikistan bound for Moscow, the Federal Security Service said on Monday.

The drugs, hidden in six plastic bags, were found on Sunday during a check on the train. The train conductors and two Tajik nationals have been detained, a spokesman said.

In a separate incident, customs officers at Pulkovo airport in St. Petersburg detained a Tajik national on Sunday who had swallowed some 600 grams of heroin.

Investigations are ongoing.

Source: RIA Novosti

Russia Obtains Azerbaijani Gas In Tug-Of-War With Europe


Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev (right) with his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev in Baku

June 29, 2009

BAKU (Reuters) -- Azerbaijan has promised Russia priority in buying natural gas from a huge deposit also coveted by Europe, the head of Russia's Gazprom said, after the Russian and Azerbaijani presidents signed a gas-supply deal.

The drive by Russia and Europe to fill their respective gas-pipeline projects from the second phase of Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz field has put Baku in the middle of a political tug-of-war between Moscow and Brussels.

Both sides have long been seeking Azerbaijani supply commitments.

After meeting Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Baku, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said the two sides had finally penned a deal.

"Today we have laid a good foundation for efficient cooperation in the gas sphere," Aliyev said. "Considering the role of natural gas as a factor in the region and in the world, the importance of the document signed today needs no explanation."

Gazprom chief Aleksei Miller said after the signing ceremony that Russia would buy a modest 500 million cubic meters of Azerbaijani gas from next year, but would increase these volumes going forward.

Those supplies would be bought from Phase 1 of Shah Deniz, which is led by BP and StatoilHydro, Miller said.

Aliyev added that Azerbaijan plans to produce 27 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas in 2009, and around 30 bcm next year.

The European Union has been courting the government in Baku to provide a gas source for the Nabucco pipeline, which would circumvent Russia to bring Central Asian gas directly to Europe, a feat that is impossible today.

The second phase of Shah Deniz, expected to cost around $10 billion, was identified as the main potential source for Nabucco, which is meant to ease Europe's energy dependence on Russia.

Russia, the world's largest gas producer, wants gas from this field to fill its planned South Stream pipeline, helping it maintain its grip over supplies of the fuel to Europe.

Source: Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

Copyright (c) 2009. RFE/RL, Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave., N.W. Washington DC 20036.

Oldest U.S. Mounted Police Unit Gets Budget Axe

June 29,2009

BOSTON (Reuters) - The oldest U.S. mounted police unit is going the way of the Pony Express, brought down by a tough economy and a budget crisis in Boston.

The unit's 10 officers on horseback are a common sight at major Boston parks and historic sites, frequently photographed by tourists and deployed primarily for crowd control.

But after 150 years, police officials said they need to eliminate the mounted unit, a move city officials estimate will save some $700,000 for a city budget that has been strained by a 19-month long U.S. recession that has hammered tax revenue.

The 10 officers and their supervisor will be reassigned within the department, Police Commissioner Edward Davis said in a note to staff, while the 10 civilian staffers who cared for the animals will be laid off.

Full story at Reuters

Firms Bid For Iraq Oil Contracts


June 30, 2009


International companies have begun bidding for the rights to develop Iraq's oil and gas reserves, nearly 40 years after the energy industry was nationalised.

Iraq is said to have the world's largest untapped oil reserves [EPA]

A total of 32 firms, including US and European giants ExxonMobil and Shell as well as companies from China, India and other Asian states, were chasing the opportunity on Tuesday to get 20-year service contracts to develop six giant oil fields and two gas fields.

The contract race is the first opportunity for the energy giants to gain a hold in the country since the Baath party nationalised the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1972, seven years before former president Saddam Hussein took power.

Iraqi oil


Oil Minister Hussein al-Shahristani told Iraqi public television: "Our principal objective is to increase our oil production from 2.4 million barrels per day to more than four million in the next five years."

He said increasing production to that level would push an extra $1.7tn into government coffers over the next 20 years.

Shahristani has said $30bn of the sum would go to the companies that extract the oil and the rest "would finance infrastructure projects across Iraq - schools, roads, airports, housing, hospitals".

The oil deposits, holding known reserves of 43 billion barrels of crude, are in southern and northern Iraq while the gas concessions are west and northeast of Baghdad.

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki opened the meeting expected to unveil which foreign companies had won contracts, saying: "These contracts are needed for the reconstruction of Iraq, they are for the benefit of Iraqis and the companies."

Companies awarded deals will have to partner with Iraqi government-owned firms, principally the South Oil Company (SOC), and share management of the fields despite fully financing their development.

They will be paid a fixed fee per barrel, not a share of profits and the fee will only be paid once a production threshold set by the government is reached.

"This raises the question of the profitability of the contract," a source involved in the bidding told the AFP news agency.

"The companies are the ones investing, but have a big problem with the fact that management will be shared," the source said.

Source: Al Jazeera

Journalist Dead: Murder or Accident?

30 June, 2009

The editor in chief of a Russian newspaper has died in the hospital, two months after he was allegedly assaulted on the staircase of his apartment block. Was yet it another attack on a journalist, or a tragic accident?

Yaroslav Yaroshenko, a journalist and human rights activist, headed Corruption and Crime monthly in the southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don.

Early in the morning on April 30, the 63-year-old was admitted to the hospital with a traumatic brain injury and remained in a coma for several days.

After a month in the hospital and several operations, Yaroshenko felt better and was allowed by doctors to go home. However, on June 30 his condition suddenly worsened. He was taken to an intensive care unit, where he soon died.

Earlier it was reported that Yaroslav was stalked by an unidentified individual as he returned home from work. The attacker hit him on the head before fleeing.

However, Yaroshenko’s colleague and friend Arkady Budnitsky told RIA Novosti that the circumstances under which Yaroshenko got the fatal injury are still not clear.

“Possibly it was an assault/attack, but he could have stumbled, too” he said. He added that he started his own investigation.

Yaroshenko’s deputy, Sergey Sleptsov, said he couldn’t believe it was just an accident because of the type of the injury. He said according to his information, “there is a pool of suspects” who could have been involved in the case.

According to NewsRu.com, Sleptsov was himself a victim of a similar attack in 2007 and offenders have still not been found.

A criminal investigation into Yaroshenko’s death has yet to be opened. According to a press representative of the regional Department of Internal Affairs, Aleksey Polyansky, there was not enough evidence of an attack.

“There were witnesses who saw the journalist stumbling on the staircase,” Polyansky told RIA Novosti. He added that Yaroshenko had worked with the press service and was known as one of the best specialists in the region.

Russia’s Union of Journalists will conduct its own investigation into the attack, which is the latest in a series of similar crimes against journalists and activists across Russia.

Corruption and Crime
monthly ceased publication when Yaroshenko was injured. But according to Sleptsov, it is possible that the newspaper will resume publication in September.

Source: Russia Today

Scientists Use DNA to Trace Illegal Elephant Poaching

By Jessica Berman
Washington
30 June 2009

A poached elephant

Scientists are using DNA to trace illegal ivory from slaughtered elephants to its countries of origin in an effort to nab poachers. Researchers are trying to combat the multi-billion dollar criminal enterprise at its source.

Since enacting the U.N. treaty outlawing the hunting of endangered elephants for their tusks in 1989, experts say illegal poaching of African elephants has only increased. The illicit ivory trade has been a bonanza for international crime syndicates, with the prized tusks fetching as much as $1,800 per kilogram on world markets.

Another poached elephant

Demand for ivory has been especially high in China. There is also a substantial market for illegal ivory in the United States and in Japan, where it is commonly fashioned into handles for knives and swords.

To combat poaching, scientists are using the genetic material from the tusks of slaughtered elephants to trace the ivory back to the countries where it originated. They have developed a method for extracting DNA from tiny samples of ivory given to them by authorities in countries where tusks have been confiscated.

An ivory market in central Africa

That DNA is then compared to a catalog of unique DNA samples taken from elephant dung in regions throughout Africa.

The head of the Center for Conservation Biology at the University of Washington in Seattle, Samuel Wasser, says researchers have pinpointed the origins of thousands of kilograms of illegal ivory smuggled out of Africa, and their evidence makes clear the terrible impact poaching is having on endangered wild elephant populations:

"People thought the only way they are getting that much ivory is by essentially cherry picking across Africa; going and taking a little from this dealer and that dealer, etc., pulling it together in a common location and shipping it out," said Samuel Wasser. "And what we showed is that for these large seizures, that is not what is happening. What is happening is that they ... are all coming from pretty much the same location. So, they are hammering this population [of elephants] over and over and over again, and it looks like the big dealers are putting out purchase orders, saying I need this many cuts by this date, and then they go and hammer this population over and over to get it to them."

Wasser says DNA fingerprinting helped investigators three years ago to make the largest seizure of illegal ivory since the global trade ban went into effect in 1989 - 10 tons of ivory contained in two separate shipments. All of the ivory was traced to a small area near the border of Tanzania and Mozambique.

An adult and a young elephant smelling the femur bone of a dead elephant

Wasser says illegal ivory is usually shipped to a number of countries before reaching its final destination in order to avoid detection and protect international dealers.

But the use of DNA, according to Wasser, makes it possible to pinpoint precisely where the ivory comes from when it is finally seized so efforts can be made to stop poachers.

"It allows us to direct limited law enforcement resources to key areas," he said. "It also tends to expose countries in denial [about] the amount of poaching going on in their country and to essentially encourage them to get more serious about policing the illegal trade."

An article on the use of DNA fingerprinting to combat the illegal ivory trade, by Samuel Wasser and fellow researchers at the University of Washington, appears in the July issue of Scientific American.

Source: Voice of America

Anti-Taliban Campaign in Pakistan's Swat Valley Enters Final Phase

By Catherine Maddux
Islamabad
29 June 2009

Pakistan says the military is in the final phase of its campaign to expel Taliban militants from northwestern Swat Valley and surrounding areas. But, there are no reports that government forces have killed or captured top Taliban leaders in the region.

The Pakistani army says all main areas in the region occupied by the militants have been cleared

Pakistanis displaced from Swat and Buner queue to get food relief in Yar Hussain camp in Swabi, 19 Jun 2009

Army spokesman Major-General Athar Abbas also told reporters Monday that Taliban command structures have been dismantled and their training centers and ammunition dumps have been destroyed. In addition, Abbas says government forces have reopened and secured strategic highway links between the northern part of Swat Valley and the west and have discovered a huge cache of arms and ammunition in the region.

But Abbas stopped short of declaring total victory in the nearly two month campaign against Taliban fighters in the area, saying some small areas of resistance remain. When a Pakistani journalist pointed out that the military has been reporting pockets of resistance in Swat Valley for the past month, Major-General Abbas sought to explain why:



Major General Athar Abbas (File photo)


"Please realize that the counter-insurgency operation - where you have to enforce the writ of the government - what was the extent of the writ lost by the government in that area," said General Abbas. "Please keep that in mind. We are getting into an area which, in our view, the government had completely lost the writ of authority. And therefore the operations sometimes in some areas is painfully slow. Because of the terrain, because of the resistance, because of a lack of support and because of the lack of information."

Abbas also asked reporters to remember how many soldiers had lost their lives and how many had been wounded, saying that is the proof of progress.

The government also predicted that within a week, some of the estimated 2.5 million people displaced by the conflict will be able to return in large numbers. And the government says it is taking care of these people, having already distributed millions of dollars in cash payments to those who were forced to flee.

Monday's progress report did not include the announcement of the capture or killing of any top Taliban leaders such as Sufi Mohammed, the radical cleric who negotiated the failed deal to impose strict Islamic law in Swat Valley. Nor was there news of the capture of killing of his son-in-law, Maulana Fazllulah, whose followers have fought fierce battles against the army in the region.

A former army lieutenant general and defense analyst, Talat Masood, says until the military eliminates the Taliban leadership in Swat Valley, success against extremists will be elusive.

"That is really the heart of the problem because they can always regroup and come back and keep on motivating people from the outside and be quite dangerous, in fact," said Talat Masood. "You know, directing it from different places. So we have get a hold of the leadership. It's very important."

In the meantime, the army is also pounding targets in nearby South Waziristan in preparation for a full-fledged assault on Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud and his forces. And on Sunday, troops faced a flare up of militant violence in North Waziristan. The army says militants unleashed a flurry of gunfire - followed by the detonation of improvised explosive devices - on a convoy of security forces. The army says 16 soldiers, including three officers, were killed along with 10 militants.

Source: Voice of America

Russia's Military In National Service Dilemma

June 30, 2009

Russia’s army needs to fill its biggest draft quota in years, but there may be not enough men to call up.

Army chiefs have vowed to meet the targets, but human rights groups are ringing the alarm after cases of illegal recruitment.

Many young Russian men are among the last recruits checking in for conscription. The spring draft of 2009 is nearly over and soon they will try on the military uniform and join the school of life.

“Of course we have to give everything we can to our motherland. I want to serve!” Ivan, a recruit says.

But not everyone is showing such military readiness. Last year, Russia cut compulsory service time from two years to one. Now a record 305,000 ranks need filling. Demographers say it’s a mission, almost, impossible.

“In the 1990s, Russia saw a massive fall in the birth rate, because of political and economic turmoil. Now we have half as many men of draft age to enlist as in previous years. This year, we are seeing the most significant decline of about 120,000 in the contingent. In the next few years, the number of 18 year-old men will keep falling,” says demographer Sergey Vassin.

The physical condition of the draftees is another head ache for the enlisters. This year, due to health problems, only every third recruit was considered fit for service.

“If we analyze the situation, we can see that the number of mobility problems and eye diseases is growing among today’s young men,” recruitment doctor Viktor Marchenko says.

Desperate to hit the target, enlisters sometimes resort to previously-illegal ways to fill their ranks.

Zamir Shukhov suffered multiple fractures and a broken neck in a car accident, but this spring he was called up to join the armed forces. He is still considered fit for service.

“I’m hiding out, because I cannot go to my own town – I’m going to be grabbed by the military service. My passport was taken away, I can’t go abroad, I have to be in Russia – within the borders – so basically, I’m fighting for my rights from underground,” Shukhov says.

Zamir is suing the Russian army. Doctors consider him handicapped, but military medics altered his diagnosis. Lawyers say, this spring, students who were previously protected from conscription by their universities have also become victims of the round-ups.

“This year the situation is tougher for the recruits because the enlisters have to fulfill a record draft plan. Enlisters are cheating. Students are picked up after exams even if their deferrals are still in place,” lawyer Aleksey Timofeev says.

Enlistment chief, Magomed Ismailov, however, denies the army is doing anything illegal.

“All 21 grounds for deferral are being considered as they were in previous years. We can’t recruit the unfit. That’s why we have double check-ups,” Ismailov says.

But in its drive to find recruits, he says the Russian army still holds to its main principle: it’s every man’s duty to serve the Motherland.

Source: Russia Today

TOBACCO UNDERGROUND: Terrorism and Tobacco

For centuries, blue-turbaned nomadic Tuareg tribesmen have led caravans of camels across the expansesof the Sahara. Laden with millet and cloth from Africa’s West Coast, the caravans traveled unmarked paths to trade for salt and dates in Timbuktu, across the sand plains of Niger, and into the mountain oasis of the Algerian south.

Smugglers take the same routes today — driving SUVs along paved roads or with guidance from the Tuareg and satellite phones — to move weapons, drugs, and, increasingly, humans — through the Sahara for transport across the Mediterranean Sea. The paths are no longer known as the Salt Roads of the Tuareg, but as the “Marlboro Connection,” named after the most lucrative contraband along this 2,000-mile corridor.

Among those who control this underground trade is al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an Algeria-based terrorist organization widely believed to have been backed by Osama Bin Laden. Descended from the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (known by its French acronym, GSPC) the group has hundreds of members and is blamed for a bloody campaign of bombings, murders, and kidnappings across North Africa and Europe. The lead smuggler, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, 37, is blamed for the 2003 kidnappings of 32 European tourists and the 2006 murder of 13 Algerian customs officials. “They are a significant threat,” says Lorenzo Vidino, author of Al Qaeda in Europe. “Of all Islamic terrorist groups, they have the most extensive and sophisticated network in Europe… And among their activities, smuggling is particularly important.”

So begins an in-depth report of how tobacco smuggling finances various terrorist groups. This article is a real eye-opener and can be read at Center For Public Integrity

Monday, June 29, 2009

Afghanistan: A Problem Shared By Russia and the United States

June 29, 2009

MOSCOW. (Vladimir Yevseyev for RIA Novosti)

It is highly unwise and often downright impossible to build a nation's security on its own interests alone in a modern world.

This is especially true of Afghanistan, which is virtually the only region where Russia's and U.S. interests are not clashing but even coincide. Afghanistan is likely to be one of the key issues for discussion at the Russian-U.S. summit next week.

Unfortunately, Russian analysts rarely realize this is no time and place for a zero-sum game, while an early pullout of the U.S. force will pose a serious threat to Russia's national interests in a strategic Central Asian region.

Americans have been in Afghanistan for seven years now, but have failed over this time to change the security situation there. The new U.S. government has already cited the Afghanistan issue as its top priority. To resolve it, they plan to establish relations with the moderate part of the Islamic opposition and to increase economic assistance, while at the same time sending more troops to the country. This policy will lead to an increase in shipment of military and civilian freight to Afghanistan. But there will be a problem here, arising from the growing activity of the Pakistani branch of the Taliban: the United States and their allies are currently losing up to 200 trucks a month in Pakistan.

The United States already has agreements on transit of non-military cargo with Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. In March 2009, they began to carry this cargo to Afghanistan along the northern route, via Latvia, Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. It transpires that Moscow is tangibly helping Washington in resolving the Afghan problem.

Still, Moscow could do more by allowing the transportation of military cargo to Afghanistan across its territory.

At the second stage of the Russian-U.S. partnership in Afghanistan, an increase in the freight traffic along the northern route could be up for discussion. However, this would be impossible without previously arranged infrastructure in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which is seriously underdeveloped. Investment in it should be made now.

American cargo could also be shipped to Afghanistan via Georgia. But for that, transport terminals will have to be built or at the very least modernized along the Caspian coastline. That route will include double transshipment. It will certainly depend on the further route chosen; but in any case, they will have to use rather worn-out rails.

The time of shipment across the Caucasus will be shortened after the Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars railway corridor is built. But in that case, there will be the matter of crossing the Caspian Sea and further transportation to Afghanistan. Therefore, this route will be only auxiliary.

The planned shutdown of the Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan is also a major factor in the region. A substantial flow of American freight currently goes through this base; it also provides refilling of aircraft supporting the coalition forces in Afghanistan.

Until recently, the Kyrgyz government insisted on closing the base before August 18, 2009. However, it must have been all along in talks on further use of Manas as a U.S. rear service base, with Russia participating informally in the consultations. As a result, on June 22, they announced plans to establish a U.S. transit center in its place, with the existing transport infrastructure preserved.

Keeping it as a transport hub to support the U.S. forces in Afghanistan has created a favorable environment for discussing the Afghan problem at the upcoming Moscow meeting between Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama.

Therefore, there is a window of political opportunities opening for Russia and the United States in Afghanistan - and it would be highly unwise to miss the chance. Each of the parties realizes that the issue at stake cannot be resolved by one of them alone. The threat of Islamic radicalism and drugs posed by an unstable Afghanistan is so real that we will not be able to avoid building a common security zone, albeit limited to one region.

Vladimir Yevseyev is senior research associate with the Institute for World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.

Command, partners to commence Empire Challenge 09

U.S. Joint Forces Command and its partners will spend the majority of the month of July examining how to better provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to U.S. and allied forces.


By MC2(AW) Nikki Carter
USJFCOM Public Affairs


(SUFFOLK, Va. - June 29, 2009) -- U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) begins the sixth annual Empire Challenge 09 demonstration (EC09) July 6.

EC09, a live joint and coalition intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) interoperability demonstration, runs simultaneously at the Naval Air Weapons Station China Lake, Calif., with distributed locations in the Joint Intelligence Lab here, the Combined Air Operations Center-Experimental at Langley Air Force Base, Hampton, Va., service Distributed Common Ground/Surface System (DCGS) labs, coalition sites in the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency in the Netherlands.

This demonstration, conducted by USJFCOM on behalf of the under secretary of Defense for intelligence, focuses on providing ISR support to warfighters at the combined task force level and below. It also examines emerging technologies to ensure they can work with existing equipment and standard procedures.

John Kittle, EC09 operational manager, said EC09 centers on bringing mission critical ISR data to the commanders who need the data at the "tactical edge."

"We are looking for solutions that provide a greater amount of situational awareness and battlespace awareness to the operators that have to make decisions on the battlefield, getting more of the intelligence data to them, better quality, more timely, more precision and all the methods and procedures and technologies that contribute to that," Kittle said.

The demonstration examines questions like what gets the job done better and what still needs to be developed.

Air Force Col. George Krakie, USJFCOM Joint Intelligence Directorate military lead for EC09 also identified another major objective.

"The key thing for us is to ensure that we are delivering mission-critical ISR data to the warfighter; this leader-centric approach means that we have to meet the needs of all leaders, whether they be a three star general in a wired ops center or a platoon sergeant with a lap top computer in a HUMVEE," said Krakie.

"The data, no matter where it comes from, needs to seamlessly flow from service to service and to our coalition partners," said Krakie.

Kittle explained the testing is done in a realistic environment where warfighters most likely will find themselves using these capabilities to work out any interoperability issues they may have with the systems.

"Once a year we go out to the desert to try to emulate to the closest degree possible the environment that our forces find themselves in and bring new systems and capabilities. We basically test them and provide an evaluation. It's really a way of testing where we are with state of the art systems," Kittle said.

The demonstration ends July 31.

Source: United States Joint Forces Command

The Real Struggle in Iran and Implications for U.S. Dialogue

June 29, 2009

By George Friedman
Stratfor

Speaking of the situation in Iran, U.S. President Barack Obama said June 26, “We don’t yet know how any potential dialogue will have been affected until we see what has happened inside of Iran.” On the surface that is a strange statement, since we know that with minor exceptions, the demonstrations in Tehran lost steam after Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for them to end and security forces asserted themselves. By the conventional wisdom, events in Iran represent an oppressive regime crushing a popular rising. If so, it is odd that the U.S. president would raise the question of what has happened in Iran.

In reality, Obama’s point is well taken. This is because the real struggle in Iran has not yet been settled, nor was it ever about the liberalization of the regime. Rather, it has been about the role of the clergy — particularly the old-guard clergy — in Iranian life, and the future of particular personalities among this clergy.

Ahmadinejad Against the Clerical Elite

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ran his re-election campaign against the old clerical elite, charging them with corruption, luxurious living and running the state for their own benefit rather than that of the people. He particularly targeted Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, an extremely senior leader, and his family. Indeed, during the demonstrations, Rafsanjani’s daughter and four other relatives were arrested, held and then released a day later.

Rafsanjani represents the class of clergy that came to power in 1979. He served as president from 1989-1997, but Ahmadinejad defeated him in 2005. Rafsanjani carries enormous clout within the system as head of the regime’s two most powerful institutions — the Expediency Council, which arbitrates between the Guardian Council and parliament, and the Assembly of Experts, whose powers include oversight of the supreme leader. Forbes has called him one of the wealthiest men in the world. Rafsanjani, in other words, remains at the heart of the post-1979 Iranian establishment.

Ahmadinejad expressly ran his recent presidential campaign against Rafsanjani, using the latter’s family’s vast wealth to discredit Rafsanjani along with many of the senior clerics who dominate the Iranian political scene. It was not the regime as such that he opposed, but the individuals who currently dominate it. Ahmadinejad wants to retain the regime, but he wants to repopulate the leadership councils with clerics who share his populist values and want to revive the ascetic foundations of the regime. The Iranian president constantly contrasts his own modest lifestyle with the opulence of the current religious leadership.

Recognizing the threat Ahmadinejad represented to him personally and to the clerical class he belongs to, Rafsanjani fired back at Ahmadinejad, accusing him of having wrecked the economy. At his side were other powerful members of the regime, including Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani, who has made no secret of his antipathy toward Ahmadinejad and whose family links to the Shiite holy city of Qom give him substantial leverage. The underlying issue was about the kind of people who ought to be leading the clerical establishment. The battlefield was economic: Ahmadinejad’s charges of financial corruption versus charges of economic mismanagement leveled by Rafsanjani and others.

When Ahmadinejad defeated Mir Hossein Mousavi on the night of the election, the clerical elite saw themselves in serious danger. The margin of victory Ahmadinejad claimed might have given him the political clout to challenge their position. Mousavi immediately claimed fraud, and Rafsanjani backed him up. Whatever the motives of those in the streets, the real action was a knife fight between Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani. By the end of the week, Khamenei decided to end the situation. In essence, he tried to hold things together by ordering the demonstrations to halt while throwing a bone to Rafsanjani and Mousavi by extending a probe into the election irregularities and postponing a partial recount by five days.

The Struggle Within the Regime

The key to understanding the situation in Iran is realizing that the past weeks have seen not an uprising against the regime, but a struggle within the regime. Ahmadinejad is not part of the establishment, but rather has been struggling against it, accusing it of having betrayed the principles of the Islamic Revolution. The post-election unrest in Iran therefore was not a matter of a repressive regime suppressing liberals (as in Prague in 1989), but a struggle between two Islamist factions that are each committed to the regime, but opposed to each other.

The demonstrators certainly included Western-style liberalizing elements, but they also included adherents of senior clerics who wanted to block Ahmadinejad’s re-election. And while Ahmadinejad undoubtedly committed electoral fraud to bulk up his numbers, his ability to commit unlimited fraud was blocked, because very powerful people looking for a chance to bring him down were arrayed against him.

The situation is even more complex because it is not simply a fight between Ahmadinejad and the clerics, but also a fight among the clerical elite regarding perks and privileges — and Ahmadinejad is himself being used within this infighting. The Iranian president’s populism suits the interests of clerics who oppose Rafsanjani; Ahmadinejad is their battering ram. But as Ahmadinejad increases his power, he could turn on his patrons very quickly. In short, the political situation in Iran is extremely volatile, just not for the reason that the media portrayed.

Rafsanjani is an extraordinarily powerful figure in the establishment who clearly sees Ahmadinejad and his faction as a mortal threat. Ahmadinejad’s ability to survive the unified opposition of the clergy, election or not, is not at all certain. But the problem is that there is no unified clergy. The supreme leader is clearly trying to find a new political balance while making it clear that public unrest will not be tolerated. Removing “public unrest” (i.e., demonstrations) from the tool kits of both sides may take away one of Rafsanjani’s more effective tools. But ultimately, it actually could benefit him. Should the internal politics move against the Iranian president, it would be Ahmadinejad — who has a substantial public following — who would not be able to have his supporters take to the streets.

The View From the West

The question for the rest of the world is simple: Does it matter who wins this fight? We would argue that the policy differences between Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani are minimal and probably would not affect Iran’s foreign relations. This fight simply isn’t about foreign policy.

Rafsanjani has frequently been held up in the West as a pragmatist who opposes Ahmadinejad’s radicalism. Rafsanjani certainly opposes Ahmadinejad and is happy to portray the Iranian president as harmful to Iran, but it is hard to imagine significant shifts in foreign policy if Rafsanjani’s faction came out on top. Khamenei has approved Iran’s foreign policy under Ahmadinejad, and Khamenei works to maintain broad consensus on policies. Ahmadinejad’s policies were vetted by Khamenei and the system that Rafsanjani is part of. It is possible that Rafsanjani secretly harbors different views, but if he does, anyone predicting what these might be is guessing.

Rafsanjani is a pragmatist in the sense that he systematically has accumulated power and wealth. He seems concerned about the Iranian economy, which is reasonable because he owns a lot of it. Ahmadinejad’s entire charge against him is that Rafsanjani is only interested in his own economic well-being. These political charges notwithstanding, Rafsanjani was part of the 1979 revolution, as were Ahmadinejad and the rest of the political and clerical elite. It would be a massive mistake to think that any leadership elements have abandoned those principles.

When the West looks at Iran, two concerns are expressed. The first relates to the Iranian nuclear program, and the second relates to Iran’s support for terrorists, particularly Hezbollah. Neither Iranian faction is liable to abandon either, because both make geopolitical sense for Iran and give it regional leverage.

Tehran’s primary concern is regime survival, and this has two elements. The first is deterring an attack on Iran, while the second is extending Iran’s reach so that such an attack could be countered. There are U.S. troops on both sides of the Islamic Republic, and the United States has expressed hostility to the regime. The Iranians are envisioning a worst-case scenario, assuming the worst possible U.S. intentions, and this will remain true no matter who runs the government.

We do not believe that Iran is close to obtaining a nuclear weapon, a point we have made frequently. Iran understands that the actual acquisition of a nuclear weapon would lead to immediate U.S. or Israeli attacks. Accordingly, Iran’s ideal position is to be seen as developing nuclear weapons, but not close to having them. This gives Tehran a platform for bargaining without triggering Iran’s destruction, a task at which it has proved sure-footed.

In addition, Iran has maintained capabilities in Iraq and Lebanon. Should the United States or Israel attack, Iran would thus be able to counter by doing everything possible to destabilize Iraq — bogging down U.S. forces there — while simultaneously using Hezbollah’s global reach to carry out terror attacks. After all, Hezbollah is today’s al Qaeda on steroids. The radical Shiite group’s ability, coupled with that of Iranian intelligence, is substantial.

We see no likelihood that any Iranian government would abandon this two-pronged strategy without substantial guarantees and concessions from the West. Those would have to include guarantees of noninterference in Iranian affairs. Obama, of course, has been aware of this bedrock condition, which is why he went out of his way before the election to assure Khamenei in a letter that the United States had no intention of interfering.

Though Iran did not hesitate to lash out at CNN’s coverage of the protests, the Iranians know that the U.S. government doesn’t control CNN’s coverage. But Tehran takes a slightly different view of the BBC. The Iranians saw the depiction of the demonstrations as a democratic uprising against a repressive regime as a deliberate attempt by British state-run media to inflame the situation. This allowed the Iranians to vigorously blame some foreigner for the unrest without making the United States the primary villain.

But these minor atmospherics aside, we would make three points. First, there was no democratic uprising of any significance in Iran. Second, there is a major political crisis within the Iranian political elite, the outcome of which probably tilts toward Ahmadinejad but remains uncertain. Third, there will be no change in the substance of Iran’s foreign policy, regardless of the outcome of this fight. The fantasy of a democratic revolution overthrowing the Islamic Republic — and thus solving everyone’s foreign policy problems a la the 1991 Soviet collapse — has passed.

That means that Obama, as the primary player in Iranian foreign affairs, must now define an Iran policy — particularly given Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak’s meeting in Washington with U.S. Middle East envoy George Mitchell this Monday. Obama has said that nothing that has happened in Iran makes dialogue impossible, but opening dialogue is easier said than done. The Republicans consistently have opposed an opening to Iran; now they are joined by Democrats, who oppose dialogue with nations they regard as human rights violators. Obama still has room for maneuver, but it is not clear where he thinks he is maneuvering. The Iranians have consistently rejected dialogue if it involves any preconditions. But given the events of the past weeks, and the perceptions about them that have now been locked into the public mind, Obama isn’t going to be able to make many concessions.

It would appear to us that in this, as in many other things, Obama will be following the Bush strategy — namely, criticizing Iran without actually doing anything about it. And so he goes to Moscow more aware than ever that Russia could cause the United States a great deal of pain if it proceeded with weapons transfers to Iran, a country locked in a political crisis and unlikely to emerge from it in a pleasant state of mind.

Source: Stratfor

Algeria: Taking the Pulse of AQIM

By Scott Stewart and Fred Burton
Stratfor

Late in the evening of June 17, 2009, militants affiliated with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) detonated two improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against a convoy near Bordj Bou Arreridj, Algeria, which is located in a mountainous area east of Algiers that has traditionally been an Islamist militant stronghold. The convoy consisted of Algerian paramilitary police vehicles escorting a group of Chinese workers to a site where they were building a new highway to connect Bordj Bou Arreridj with Algiers. After disabling the convoy using IEDs, the militants then raked the trapped vehicles with small-arms fire. When the ambush was over, 18 policemen and one Chinese worker had been killed. Another six gendarmes and two Chinese workers were wounded in the attack.

It was the deadliest attack of any type in Algeria since an Aug. 19, 2008, suicide vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) attack against a line of job applicants outside a police academy in Les Issers that killed 48 and injured another 45. AQIM regularly launches armed ambushes and roadside IED attacks in Algeria, and ambushes were frequently used by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) before it announced in September 2006 that it had become part of al Qaeda’s regional franchise — AQIM. Indeed, we have seen four other ambush and IED attacks since May 20, 2009, but the death tolls in such attacks have usually been smaller than the June 17 attack.

In light of this anomalous attack, we thought it would be an opportune time to take the pulse of AQIM and try to get a sense of where the group stands today and where it might be going over the next few months.

History and Trends

The GSPC began as a splinter of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in 1998 as the civil war in Algeria was winding down. At that time, Hassan Hattab led a group of other disaffected GIA members who disagreed with GIA’s targeting of unarmed civilians. Hattab and his followers wanted to distance themselves from the large-scale massacres that had taken place while continuing their struggle against the Algerian government. They formed the GSPC to give themselves a fresh name and a new start.

Hattab eventually ran into disputes within the GSPC as the group was increasingly drawn to the transnational jihadist campaign espoused by al Qaeda. He “resigned” (though he was effectively deposed) as the group’s leader in 2001 and was succeeded by Nabil Sahraoui, who declared the GSPC’s allegiance to al Qaeda. Security forces killed Sahraoui in 2004.

In a message issued on Sept. 11, 2006, al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri announced that the GSPC had joined forces with al Qaeda in a union he hoped would be “a thorn in the neck of the American and French Crusaders and their allies, and an arrow in the heart of the traitors and apostates.” On Sept. 13, GSPC acknowledged the merger on its Web site with a message from its emir, Abu Musab Abd al-Wadoud, who wrote, “We have full confidence in the faith, the doctrine, the method and the modes of action of [al Qaeda’s] members, as well as their leaders and religious guides.”

The newly-established al Qaeda franchise in Algeria was not idle for long. On Oct. 19, 2006, it conducted two IED attacks, one against a police station in El Harrach, an eastern suburb of Algiers, the second against a fuel storage site belonging to the French company Razel in Lakhdaria. On Oct. 29, 2006, the group conducted near-simultaneous VBIED attacks against two Algerian police stations in Reghaia and Dergana. While simultaneous VBIED attacks were something seen in al Qaeda operations, these attacks involved vehicles parked near their targets rather than suicide vehicles and, as such, resembled past GSPC attacks, as did the selection of police stations as targets. Because of these features, the attacks were seen as examples of a hybrid, or transitional, kind of attack.

Other transitional attacks continued into early 2007, such as the twin attacks on March 5, 2007, which targeted foreign oil workers and Algerian security forces, indicating AQIM was incorporating the security-force targets of the GSPC with the foreign-influence targets of al Qaeda.

The focus on foreign interests and the energy sector was seen in several other attacks and attempted attacks against foreign oil workers and pipelines in late 2006 and early 2007. In spite of this focus, to date, AQIM has not been able to launch any truly disruptive attacks against the Algerian energy sector.

On April 11, 2007, AQIM passed another threshold when the group employed two suicide VBIEDS in attacks against separate targets in Algiers. One device was directed at the prime minister’s office in the city center and the second targeted a police station near the international airport in the eastern part of the city. At least 33 people reportedly were killed in the blasts and more than 150 wounded. These attacks marked the first suicide attacks in Algeria connected with GSPC or AQIM and signified a change in tactics.

However, the group’s increased operational tempo and less discriminate target selection came with consequences. In mid-2007 the Algerian government launched a massive operation against AQIM that resulted in large losses of men and materiel for the group. AQIM’s shift in targeting strategy also caused disagreements within the insurgency’s leadership. The schism arose between members who favored the tradition GSPC target set and opposed killing civilians, and those members who were more heavily influenced by al Qaeda and wanted to hit foreign and symbolic targets with little regard for civilian casualties.

In spite of the government crackdown, and in the face of growing internal dissent, AQIM accelerated its suicide bombing campaign, and there were several other suicide attacks during the last three months of 2007. These attacks included the Sept. 6 bombing of a crowd waiting to greet Algerian President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika in Batna that killed 22 people and injured more than 100; a Sept. 8 suicide VBIED attack against a naval barracks in Dellys that killed 30; and twin suicide VBIED attacks on Dec. 11 that targeted the constitutional court and the headquarters of the U.N. refugee agency in Algiers that killed 47 people, including 17 U.N. employees.

AQIM conducted six suicide bombing attacks against military and police targets between January 2008 and the Aug. 19, 2008, VBIED attack against the police academy in Les Issers. During this time, military and law enforcement pressure by the Algerian government continued, as did the public criticism of AQIM for killing innocents. The criticism reached a crescendo after the Les Issers attack, which killed largely poor people looking for employment with the police. AQIM has only conducted one suicide attack since August 2008, and the bulk of its operations have been in sparsely populated areas instead of cities. It is unclear at this point whether these observable shifts are in response to the criticism of AQIM’s tactics or if they are a result of the government’s efforts to dismantle the group.

Large VBIEDs are resource intensive. In fact, the explosives required to construct one large VBIED could be used to manufacture many smaller IEDs or suicide vests. Since the Les Issers attack, AQIM has conducted several IED attacks but these have all involved smaller IEDs, and the number of bystander deaths has dropped as the attacks have appeared to have been more carefully aimed at government or foreign targets. Of course, suicide bombers are also a resource that can only be used once, and it takes time and effort to recruit new bombers.

We will be watching carefully to see if the current trend away from the employment of large VBIEDs in urban areas is a temporary lull caused by government pressure and a lack of resources, or if it is an intentional shift designed to assuage public anger. It is very difficult for an insurgent organization to thrive in an environment where the local population turns against it, and perhaps the AQIM leadership has learned a lesson from the high cost the GIA paid after it began killing civilians and lost public support.

In addition to the military and law enforcement pressure, the Algerian government has been very busy in its efforts to apply ideological pressure to AQIM. One way this pressure has been applied is in the form of former militant leaders associated with the group criticizing its change in targeting and tactics. For example, after the Les Issers bombing in August 2008, GSPC founder Hassan Hattab called on the militants to lay down their arms and surrender. There is also talk that the government may soon expand an amnesty offer to include members of the organization who have been excluded from the current amnesty offer because they were deemed to have too much blood on their hands. Like previous amnesty offers, this expansion could serve to further weaken the organization as members choose to turn themselves in.

Regional Franchise?

By design, AQIM incorporated the GSPC with elements of Morocco’s Islamic Combatant Group, Libya’s Islamic Fighting Group, several Tunisian groups, most notably the Tunisian Combatant Group, and jihadists in Mali, Niger and Mauritania. However, in practice, the vast majority of the group’s infrastructure came from the GSPC, and attacks since the founding of AQIM in 2006 have reflected this. Indeed, in spite of the many high-profile Libyan and Moroccan militants who serve as part of the al Qaeda core leadership, Libya and Morocco have been extremely calm since the emergence of AQIM, and the group has remained an Algeria-based phenomenon.

In Mauritania, attacks linked to AQIM began as early as December 2007, but AQIM militants there have not displayed the capability to carry out sophisticated attacks. Most attacks in Mauritania involve amateurish small-arms assaults such as the attack on French tourists on Dec. 23, 2007, or the Feb. 1, 2008, shooting at the Israeli embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania’s capital. As we were writing this, we learned of the June 23 shooting of an American teacher in Nouakchott. The man was reportedly gunned down outside the school where he taught, and Mauritanian officials are blaming the attack on AQIM rather than criminals.

The attacks in Mauritania have shown rudimentary tactics with poor planning, and the militants associated with AQIM in Mauritania simply have not displayed the ability to mount a large-scale, coordinated attack. The group’s activities in Mali and Niger are also mainly constrained to low-level attacks against government or military outposts and foreign mining sites and personnel in the northern stretches of those countries. AQIM also conducts training and engages in smuggling and kidnappings for ransom in this deserted region.

This means that, in the end, in spite of all the hype associated with the AQIM name, the group is essentially a rebranded GSPC and not some sort of revolutionary new organization. It has adapted its target set to include foreign interests, and it did add suicide bombing to its repertoire, but aside from that there has been very little movement toward AQIM’s becoming a truly regional threat.

That said, AQIM has received a lot of attention from the al Qaeda core leadership, which has sought to support it however it can and spur it on beyond Algeria. On June 23, 2009, al Qaeda media wing As Sahab released a 35-minute video statement from Abu Yahya al-Libi entitled “Algeria Between the Sacrifice of Fathers and Faithfulness of Sons.” As his name implies, al-Libi is himself from Libya, and one of the things he does in the video is urge militants in Algeria, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco to mobilize and join under the “banner, command and emirate” of AQIM. The video appears to be an attempt by the al Qaeda leadership to counter ideological attacks by the Algerian government as well as AQIM’s regional stagnation.

Coming Home to Roost?

In addition to fighting against the regime in Algeria, Algerian militants have also been very conspicuous on jihadist battlefields such as Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq. Some studies have even concluded that Algerians were the single largest group of foreign jihadists who fought in Iraq during the height of the insurgency.

One of the things we have been anticipating for several years now is a boomerang effect as foreign jihadists leave places such as Iraq and Pakistan and return home. While many foreign jihadists have been killed in such places, those who survive after fighting sophisticated foes like the American military are not only hardened but also possess insurgent tradecraft skills that make them far more lethal when they leave those battlefields than when they entered them. Indeed, we have seen a migration of IED technology and tactics from Iraq to other theaters, such as Afghanistan.

With developments in Iraq over the last few years that have made Iraq increasingly inhospitable to foreign jihadists, and with Pakistan now quickly becoming less friendly, many of the Algerian militants in those places may be seeking to return home. And this brings us back to the anomalous vehicular ambush on June 17.

That operation, while a common type of attack in Algeria, was uncharacteristically deadly. It is plainly possible that the high death toll was merely a fluke. Perhaps the AQIM militants got lucky or the Algerian gendarmes targeted in the attack made a fatal mistake. However, the increased death toll could also have been a result of superior IED design, or superior planning by the operational leader of the ambush. Such a shift could indicate that an experienced operational commander or bombmaker has come to AQIM from someplace like Iraq or Pakistan. It will be very important to watch the next few AQIM attacks to see if the June 17 attack was indeed just an anomaly or if it was the beginning of a new and deadly trend.

Source: Stratfor